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LOYOLA LAW REVIEW
Volume 29, Number 2, Spring 1983

ARTICLES

CODIFYING CASTE: LOUISIANA'S RACIAL
CLASSIFICATION SCHEME AND THE FOURTEENTH
AMENDMENT
Raymond T. Diamond* and Robert J. Cottrol**

The term "caste" is frequently employed by social scientists
and others to describe patterns of black-white relations in the
United States.1 While the parallel with the system of social stratifi
cation classically found on the Indian subcontinent is not totally
satisfactory,2 there are sufficient similarities between these two

•

A.B. 1973, J.D. 1977, Yale University; Member of the Bar of the District of Columbia

and the State of Louisiana.
**

A B. 1971, Ph.D. 1978, Yale University; Lecturer in History, Georgetown University.
.

1. Among the many works that have made the parallel between the Hindu caste sys
tem and black-white relations in the United States are J. DOLLARD, CASTE AND CLASS IN A
SOUTHERN TO WN passim (1957); D. KATSMAN, BEFORE THE GHETI'O: BLACK DETROIT IN THE
NINETEENTH CENTURY 81-103 (1973); G. MYRDAL, AN AME RICAN DILEMMA: THE NEGRO PROB
LEM AND

MODERN DEMOCRACY 667-88 (1962).

2. Although almost every social scientist who has examined race relations in the
Unit ed States has, to some extent, employed the parallel, we would argue that the parallel is
highly problemati c because of the very d ifferent ideological underpinnings of classical In
dian socie ty and American society. While the caste system was an integral part of Hindu

theo logy, the American racial caste system has always been at odds with American egalita
rian ideals. As such, American patterns of caste, like discrimination, have always generated
protests among white as well as black Americans. For an interesting treatment of the Indian
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systems to make the comparison at least compelling, if not com
pletely precise. Like the Hindu caste system , the black-white dis
tinction in the United States has supplied a social hierachy deter
mined at birth, and arguably immutable, even by subsequent
achievement. In the United States, caste-like d istinctions between
black and white frequently have had their origins in distinctions
mandated by law. Judicially and legislatively mandated racial dis
tinctions have played major roles in the American caste system, at
times following social trends, but more often helping to shape
them. 3 Crucial in forming the social underpinnings of the American
caste system has been the very definitions of black and white in
the American context.
A case of current interest• and of possible practical importance
for an undetermined number of Louisianians is Doe v. Louisiana,5
a case which tells much about the role of social classification and
the maintenance of caste in America. The case reveals the lament
of Susie Guillory Phipps, a woman of undeniable slave ancestry
whose appearance is that of a white person and whose upbringing
and experience, she 6laims, is that of a white person, but whose
birth certificate publicly classifies her under law to be black. A
trial court judge has ruled that her birth certificate may not be
changed, and the case is now on appeal.
P hipps claims to be the victim of Louisiana's racial classificacaste system and its weakening among Indians who received British university educations in
the early twentieth century, see M. WEBER, THE RELIGION OF INDIA: THE Soc10LOGY or
DUISM AND BUDDHISM 3-133

3.

(H.

HIN

Gerth & G. Martindale trans. 1958).

C. Vann Woodward convincingly challenged the idea that the rigid patterns of seg

regation that prevailed for most of the twentieth century southern history were simply

an

application of traditional southern mores. His study demonstrated that laws passed in the
late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries played a major role i n helping to shape pat
terns of social segregation in the South. See C. WooDWARD, THE STRANGE CAREER OF J1M
CROW passim (1957).

4.

See, e.g., Ruth, Woman ls Lingering in Gray Area as State Has Yet to Decide Her

Race, Times Picayune, Feb. 6, 1983, § 1 at 19, col. 2; Letter from Paul D. Bond entitled
"American race," Times Picayune/States Item, Sept 23, 1982, § 1 at 12, col. 2; Anderson,
Woman is Fierce in Fight to Right Her Race Record, Times Picayune/States Item, Sept. 20,
1982, § 1 at 1 1 , col. l; Anderson, Experts Doubt Reliability of Fam ily-Tree Chart, Times
Picayune/States Item, Sept. 16, 1982, § 6 at 4, col. l; Anderson, La. Woman's Relatives Say
They Liued As 'Coloreds,' Times Picayune/States Item, Sept. 15, 1 982, § 1 at 17, col. l;
Anderson, Parents Raised Her as a 'White Child,' Woman Tells Court, Times Picayune/
States Item, Sept 14, 1982, § 1 at 9, col. l; Schlangenstein, Black or White? Family Chal
lenges La. Guidelines, Times Picayune/States Item, Sept 12, 1982, § 1 at e, col. l; NBC
News, Monitor News Broadcast (Mar. 4, 1 983).

5. No. 78-9513 consolidated with 8 1 -4201, slip ops. (Ori. Parish, C.D.C., May 18, 1983),
appeal docketed, No. CA 1120 (4th Cir. July 27, 1983).
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tio n scheme, which falls into three parts. First, title 40, section
34(A)(l)(k) of the Louisiana Revised Statutes8 mandates that the
race or races of parents be e ntered on an individual's birth certifi

cate. Second, section 267 of title 427 has provided:

In signifying race, a person having one-thirty-second or less of
Negro blood shall not be deemed, described, or designated by any
public official in the State of Louisiana as "colored,"

a

"mulatto," a

"black," a "negro," a "griffe," an "Afro-American," a "quadroon,'' a
"mestizo,'' a "colored person,'' or a "person of color."8

Since the decision of the trial court, this section has been re
pealed, 9 but because the repeal is not clearly retrospective in na
ture, section 267 is still at issue in the case on appeal. Lastly,
Phipps must meet an extraordinary burden of proof to change her
racial classification, i.e., leaving "no room for doubt" that her birth
certificate d esignation should be changed from black to white.10
Currently, new birth certificates in Louisiana are issued as a
matter course without racial designations.11 The legislature has
prohibited the issuance of new birth certificates with such data,
even though the information is in the hands of the state, unless
it

requested on behalf of the individual whose birth is recorded.
However, this prohibition does not obtain with respect to earlier
issued birth certificates, and whatever discriminatory intent has
accompanied Louisiana's racial classification scheme finds full ef
fect with respect to earlier issued certificates.
Aside from the factual question of the extent of her black or
Negro heritage, Phipps challenges the constitutionality of sections
40:34(A)(l)(k) and 42:267,13 contending that they violate the equal
6.

LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 40:34(a)(l)(k) (West Supp. 1983).

7.

Id. § 42:267(West 1983).

8. Id. Louisiana also mandates that the race of a person be stated on death certifi
cates. LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 40:34(A)(2)(c) (West Supp. 1983). But. racially labeling the
deceased has much less effect than racially labeling the living. Race designations on death
certificates are not the subject of Doe

v.

Louisiana and are not the subject of this article.

Another classic identification device, the driver's license, no longer carries a racial designa
tion in Louisiana.
9. 1983 La. Acts 441. To repeal R.S. 42:267, relative to the c riterion for signification of
race by public officials in Louisiana, and otherwise to provide with respect thereto. Be it

enacted by the Legislature of Louisiana:
Section 1. R.S. 42:267 is hereby repealed in its entirety.
10. State ex rel. Plaia v. Louisiana State Bd. of Health, 296 So.2d 809, 810 (La. 1974).
11. LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 40:39(B)(West Supp. 1983).
12.
13.

Id.
Whe ther LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 42:267 is so vague

as

to violate due p rocess require-
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protection clause of the fourteenth amendment to the Constitution
of the United States.14 It is the question of equal protection that
this article treats, the question whether Louisia na's scheme of ra
cial definition, categorization, and classification has evinced ra
cially discriminatory purpose and effect, i.e., the maintenance of
social caste based on race.
I.

RACE AND CASTE IN THE UNITED STATES

Racial castes in America had their origins in the earliest pe
riod o f colonization. To properly examine the existence of racial
castes in this nation one must examine the historical record to find
the hows and whys of racial distinctions. Louisiana's own racial
castes have been modified in their development by something akin
to characteristics of Latin American acceptance of caste without
color determination, 15 but nonetheless bear close resemblance to
those of the nation as a whole. Especially given such Latin Ameri
can characteristics involving mobility across caste lines regardless
of color, Louisiana's racial c lassification scheme holds the pheno
typically white, but classified as black person a t the mercies of
those who otherwise would impose the private sanctions that ac
company public identification with inferior caste.
A.

Racial Castes - An American Tradition

Of necessary importance in evaluating Louisiana's racial clas
sification statutes is an examination of the historical and cultural
milieu in which the statutes were legislated and in which those af
fected must live. An inquiry as to this milieu reveals a damning
history, one that renders the purposes underlying the racial classi
fication statutes extremely questionable and suggests that the efments, and is therefore unenforceable, is a legitimate question, and has been considered by
Louisiana courts. See Plaia, 296 So.2d 809. See also Thomas v. Louisiana State Bd. of
Health, 278 So.2d 915 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1973). This issue, however, is not the subject of this
article.
�4.. All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the juris
diction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the
State wherein they reside.
�o Stat� �hall make or enforce any law which shall abridge
the privileges or immuni
t�es of c1t1zens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive
any person of life,
�1b�rt�, �r property, without due process of law; nor
deny to any person within its
JUnsd1ctlon the equal protection of the laws.
U.S . CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
15.
See infra notes 55-75 and accompanyin
g text.
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fects of such classifications are constitutionally objectionable.
The common and legal definitions of the term "Negro" in the
United States traditionally have been broad enough to include
many individuals who, like Susie Phipps, appear white, would be
classified as white in most of the nations of the world, and are of
predominately European ancestry.16 The genealogical rigor of such

definitions had its origins in the efforts of American law to enforce
racially based slavery and discrimination. The origins of such laws
resemble efforts elsewhere to develop legally mandated caste sys

tems based on ethnicity or race, but stand in marked contrast to
the approach in other multi-ethnic societies where group
prejudices exist, but without reinforcement by the State erecting a
hermetic

seal of laws differentiating between

racial or ethnic

categories.
The American pattern of racial classification had its origins in
American slavery. Because slavery in the United States was based
on race, the law had to define the statuses of the two races to make
the system function. This necessitated an effort t o define member
ship in the different races. Such a definition could define slavery or
freedom as well as other less critical rights and disabilities. Early
American law and society responded gradually to the unfolding
equation of race and bondage in colonial America. The presump
tion that Negroes were slaves and whites were free was by no
means fixed when black and white first encountered each other in

England's North American colonies.17 Whether or not one accepts
the view of an English predisposition toward anti-black
prejudice, 18 it seems likely that many of the first blacks brought to
the North American colonie s in the seventeenth century were ser
vants in bondage for a period of years, not slaves. Early seven
teenth century colonial laws reflected the unsettled status of early
African laborers in North American colonies.19
16. c. DEGLER, NEITHER BLACK Noa W HITE: SLAVERY AND RACE RELATIONS IN BRAZIL
AND THE UNITED STATES 101-02 (1971).
17.

A. HIGGINBOTHAM, JR., IN THE MATTER OF COLOR: RACE AND THE AMERICAN LEGAL

PROCESS: THE COLONIAL PERIOD 19-22(1978); T. BREEN & s. INNES, MYNE OWNE GROUND:

RACE AND FREEDOM ON VIRGINIA'S EASTERN SHORE, 1640-1676, at 3-6(1980).
18. W. JORDAN, WHITE OVER BLACK: AMERICAN ATTITUDES TOWARD THE NEGRO, 15501812, at 3-43(1968).
19. Blacks in this early colonial period appear to have suffered under legal and social
disabilities not significantly different from those endured by white servants, particularly

those who were not English. The law made distinctions between Christian and non-Chris
tian servants, not between black and white. Laws employed the term "servants" instead of
"sl
aves. " Ironically, Massachusetts codified the black's slave status before Virginia. It would
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By the eighteenth century, the uncertainty was beginning to
be resolved as the number o f blacks in British North American col
onies increased and slavery took on greater economic importance
in the southern colonies.20 S lavery's increased importance, coupled
with the growth in black population, posed a problem in social
control. The lines between black slaves and white indentured ser
vants, at least in the plantation South, became more rigid as plant
ers in s outhern colonies realized that if the two groups were not
separated, they might make common cause, and upset the equilib
rium o f the emerging plantation social economy.21 Race took on
heightened importance; the beginnings of a legally mandated racial
caste system were under way.22
Ironically, that caste system was made more formal and more
rigid because of the liberal ideals of the American Revolution. The
American Revolution significantly expanded the free Negro class.23
By the end of the eighteenth century, slavery i n the North was on
the road to extinction. 24 Its demise was fueled by Revolutionary
idealism and permitted by the marginal economic advantage of
northern slavery. Even in the South, numerous manumissions in
the late eighteenth century created a large free Negro population,
particularly in the upper South. 211 While a free black population
had existed since the earliest settlements in British North
America, the great expansio n of the post-Revolutionary era raised
new questions about its status.
Initially, there seems to have been a tende ncy not to legally
distinguish the two different groups of free people. All of the
northern states and a number of southern states permitted free
blacks to vote in the latter part of the eighteenth and the begin
ning of the nineteenth century.26 The federal C o nstitution did not
take the laws of the southern colony until the end of the seventeenth century to legislate
slave status for blacks, an action that Massachusetts legislators took decades earlier. See A.
HIGGINBOTHAM, supra note 17, at 21-22, 36-37, 61 -62.
20. W. JORDAN, supra note 18, at 82.
21. See E. MORGAN, AMERICAN SLAVERY, AMERICAN FREEDOM: THE ORDEAL
VIRGINIA passim (1975).

oF

COLONIAL

22.
23.

W. JORDAN, supra note 18, at 9 1 -98.
A. ZILVERSMIT, THE FIRST EMANCIPATION: THE ABOLITIO
N OF SLAVERY IN THE NORTH
passim (1967); W. JORDAN, supra note 1 8, at
346-48.
24. A. ZILVERSMIT, supra note 23.
25. W. JORDAN, supra note 18, at 346-48.

�

26. States t at legally p�rmitted free blacks
to vote in the late eighteenth and early
.
ninetee nth centuries were Mame, Vermont, New
Hampsh ire, Massachusetts, Connecticut,
Rhode Island , New York, New Jersey, Pennsy
lvania, Maryland, North Carolina, and Ten·
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mention race in outlining qualifications for office holders or elec
tors.27 Certainly, some of this may have been oversight, but the
failure to make race a specific criterion for exercising the preroga
tives of citizenship should be attributed in part to the spirit of the
Revolutionary era. It was a time when numerous people, including
many who drafted the fundamental charters of federal and state
governments, recognized the inconsistency of upholding both the
Revolution's liberal postulates and the idea of racial disabilities.
The post-Revolutionary era held promise, albeit possibly slim, that
the racial caste system that had begun to emerge i n the eighteenth
century might be curtailed, at least for the emerging free black
population.
That promise proved illusory. Whether that i nitial lack of ref
erence to race in late eighteenth century legislation stemmed from
oversight or idealism, by the nineteenth century, efforts were made
to insure that the free black population did not escape the stric
tures of caste. The federal government led the way in this effort.
Congress restricted membership in the militia to white men in
1792. 28 I n the early nineteenth century, employment in the post
office was limited to whites. 29 State laws enacted i n the nineteenth
century also reflect the effort to insure a separate and inferior
place for all blacks, slave and free. After the War of 1812, most
nessee. As racism became more acute and explicit in the nineteenth century, a number of
these states curtailed black voting rights. Blacks were legally disfranchised in New Jersey in
1807, in Maryland in 1810, in Connecticut in 1818, in Rhode Island i n 1822, in Tennessee i n
1834, i n North Carolina in 1835, and in Pennsylvania in 1838. The N e w York Constitution
of 1822 abolished property qualifications for white voters but established a $250 property
requirement for black voters. In 1842, black voting rights were restored in Rhode Island.
One ironic feature of the disfranchisement of black voters was that it frequently coincided
with the abolition of property requirements for white voters. See R. C o'M'ROL, THE AFRO

YANKEES: PROVIDENCE'S BLACK COMMUNITY IN THE ANTEBELLUM ERA 42-43, 76-77(1982); J.
FRANKLIN, FROM SLAVERY TO FREEDOM: A HISTORY OF NEGRO AMERICAN 162 (5th ed. 1980);
Wrig ht, Negro Suffrage in New Jersey, 1776-1875, 33 J. OF NEGRO H1sT. 168(1948).
27. That portion of article I, secti o n 2, discussing membership in the House of Repre
sentatives that counted the slave population as three-fifths of the rest of the population for
representation purposes has commonly been misinterpreted as an indication that the fram
ers of the Constitution believed that blacks were three-fifths human. Two points should be
stressed: The first is that article I, section 2, accorded full representation for a state's free
blac k as well as free white population; the second is that the three-fifths clause was a com
promise between northern delegates to the Constitutional Convention, who argued that
southern states should not get additional representatives based on their slave populations,
and souther n delegates who wanted the slave population counted to boost their states' rep
resentation. See W. JORDAN, supra note 18, at 322.

28.

L. LITWACK, NORTH OF SLAVERY: THE NEGRO IN THE FREE STATES, 1790-1860, at 31-

32 (1 961).

29.

Id. at 31.
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states restricted the ballot t o white men, disfranchising a number
of black men who previously had enjoyed, and in some cases exer
cised, the right to vote.30 Legal discriminations in schooling, access
to public accommodations, the right to redress through the courts,
even the right to reside in certain states as a free person, all began
to solidify in the nineteenth century. There was, o f course, a range
of discrimination in the different states. Legal discrimination in
New England remained relatively mild, while it grew progressively
more strident in the South. 31 The early nineteenth century period
which saw the expansion of the cotton kingdom was also a time of
expanding democratic rights for the white population. This egali
tarianism of what has been loosely termed the "Jacksonian era"
stood in stark contrast to the entrenchment of slavery in the South
and the e rosion of the rights o f free Negroes throughout the coun
try. Antebellum America was becoming more democratic and egali
tarian. for whites, and increasingly oppressive for blacks. 32
The way to resolve the paradox of bondage in a free society
was to proclaim blacks different, the peculiar e xception to the
democratic order in the new republic.33 Once that argument was
advanced, slavery and racial discrimination were made sensible.
Blacks, inherently inferior, dependent, and childlike, were deemed
unfit to govern their own lives, much less participate in the emerg
ing democratic order. Slavery's apologists argued that there was no
30.

See supra note 26.

31.

This reinvigoration of a legal basis for a caste system w a s related to two develop

ments, the expansion of the American slave system and the expansion of American democ
racy. Southern statesmen in the late e i ghteenth century were willing to countenance discus
sion of abolition and willing to concede slavery's evils. By the nineteenth century, that was
changing. The institution was made more robust, more economically vital, by the invention
of the cotton gin and the addition of new, cultivatable land in the West. The developing
cotton economy rested on a basis of slave labor; new economic imperatives tended to dimin
ish previous discomfort with the owning of human beings. See W. JORDAN, supra note 18, at
428-81 (discussing Thomas Jefferson's thoughts on slavery). See also S. RATNER, J. SOLTOW

& R. SYLLA THE EVOLUTION OF THE AMERICAN ECONOMY: GROWTH, WELFARE, AND DECISION
MAKING 146-48(1979).
32. See supra note 26.
33. For an interesting sampling of pro-slavery thought, see SLAVERY DEFENDED: THE
VIEWS OF THE OLD SouTH passim (E. McKitrick ed. 1963). E. Pollard's essay, Black
Diamonds, id. at 162-68, supplies a quintessential example of the viewpoint that blacks were
a childlike, dependent people, ideally suited to slavery. An interesting counter exam ple
among pro-slavery writers, also found i n McKitrick's volume, is that
of George Fitzugh. His
�oci�lo�y for th� South, id. at 34-50, w a s less concerned with arguing the case for Negro
mfenonty than 1t was with attacking liberalism and capitalism.
Fitzugh's view was that the
slave system of the South was a more humane order than the
system of free labor existing in
the North and Europe. By implicatio n, at least, Fitzugh's essay
m a d e a case for extending
an unfree labor system to white workers in the North and
Europe.
,
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contradiction between liberal society and their peculiar institution.
The former was for whites, the latter for blacks.
The a nomalous position o f blacks was underscored in

1857 by

Chief Justice Roger Taney in Scott v. Sanford.3• In delivering the
judgment of the Supreme Court, he delivered also the dictum that
blacks, owing to their background of slavery, were "not included
under the name of citizens . . . and were not in the contemplation
of the framers of the Constitution when [the] privileges and immu
nities were provided for."311 Free blacks posed a threat to the in
creasingly Herrenvolk36 direction that American democracy was
taking. Their ability to manage their own lives contradicted one of
the fundamental premises used to justify slavery. In the South,
they were feared as, at best, bad examples and, at worst, potential
allies of slaves.37 F ree blacks living in the North were seen as less
disturbing to the social equilibrium; however, they too, by and
large did not share in the growing democratization of American
institutions. 38
Throughout the antebellum period, the law's support for the
caste system virtually eliminated in all but a handful of states ves
tiges of black citizenship that had survived the post-Revolutionary
era.39 Manumissions became
34.
35.
36.

more difficult in southern states.

60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857).
Id. at 402-03.
G. FREDRICKSON, THEBLACK IMAGE IN THE WHITE MIND: THE DEBATE ON AFRO·

AMERICAN CHARACTER AND DESTINY, 1817-1914, at 61, 64 (1971): P. VAN DENBERGHE, RACE

AND RACISM: A COMPARATIVE PERSPEC TIVE 17-18(1967). Van den Berghe employed the term

"Herrenvolk Democracy" to describe those s ocieties that are egalitarian and democratic for

superordinate groups but undemocratic for s ubordinate groups. A good modern example of
this is the Republic of South Africa.

37.

See generally I.BERLI N , SLAVES WITHOUT MASTERS: THE FREE NEGRO IN THE ANTE·

DELLUM SOUTH passim (1974).

38.

Part of the reason for the exclusion of blacks from participation in democratic

institutions that emerged in the antebellum North was political. The Democratic party,
which played a major role in a number of egalitarian reforms, including extending the vote

to propertyless white men, was often viciously anti-black. This antipathy between the party
of the white workingman and blacks existed partly because of the Democratic party's na
tional ties to the slaveholding South and partly because of the tendency of the earliest black
voters in the Northeast to vote Federalist. North and South, free blacks found themselves
stigmatiz ed by the enhanced caste system, albeit less so than the over ninety percent of the

See R. COTTROL, supra n ote 26, at 103-04;
L. CURRY, THE FREEBLACK IN URBAN AMERICA, 1800-1850; L. LITWACK, supra note 28, at 8081.
antebellum black population that was enslaved.

39. The New England states (except Connecticut) allowed black men to vote on the
same basis as white men. New York permitted black men who had $250 worth of property
to vote, while not requiring property for white voters. Legal discrimination against blacks
existed in New York and New England (with the possible exceptions of Maine, Vermont,
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Many state legislatures forbade the freeing of slaves or the settle 
ment of free blacks absent special legislative approval.40 The Fugi
tive Slave Act of 1850 extended the presumption that blacks were
slaves by denying the right of jury trials to alleged f ugitives. 41
Chief Justice Taney's dictum in the Dred Scott case proclaimed:
"The Negro has no rights that the white man is bound to re

spect. "42 Legally in the antebellum era, the rigors of caste were
made absolute.
The Civil War, emancipation, the thirteenth, 43 fourteenth,44

and fifteenth411 amendments, together with Reconstruction and
postbellum civil rights legislation, softened but hardly eliminated
the juridical caste system. Legal discrimination persisted during
post-war Reconstruction and intensified with the return of white
southern rule.48 Toward the end of the nineteenth century, legisla
tion in the states of the former Confederacy eviscerated many of
the rights won by blacks after the Civil War.47 And, as if to add
supporting ritual to the American version of caste relations, legisla
tive and private actions, primarily though not exclusively in the
South, developed "Jim Crow."
Jim Crow established an etiquette of discrimination.48 It was
not enough for blacks to be second class citizens, denied the
franchise and consigned to inferior schools. Black subordination
was reinforced by a racialist punctilio dictating separate seating on
public accommodations, separate water fountains and restrooms,
separate seats in courthouses, and separate Bibles to swear in
and New Hampshire, which had very small black populations). Legally segregated schools,
for example, were the rule in New York and New England cities in areas where sizable black
populations lived. Massachusetts abolished

de jure

segregation in schools in 1855. In 1843,

that state repealed its law against interracial marriage. See J. HORTON & L. HORTON,BLACK
BOSTONIANS: FAMILY LIFE AND COMMUNITY STRUGGLE IN THE ANTEBELLUM NORTH 70, 92

(1979).
40.
41.
42.
43.

E. GENOVESE, ROLL JORDAN ROLL: THE WORLD THE SLAVES MADE 398-402 (1974).
R. COVER, JUSTICE ACCUSED: ANTISLAVERY AND THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 175-76 (1975).
Scott, 60 U.S. (19 How.) at 400.
"Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as a punishment for crime
whereof the party shall have been duly convicted, shall exist within the United States, or
any place subject to their jurisdiction. " U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, § 1.
44. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. See supra note 14 for text o f the amendment.
45. "The right of citizens of the United States to vote shall n o t be denied or abridged
by the United States or by any State o n account of race, color, o r previous condition of
servitude." U.S. CoNST. amend. XV, § 1.
46. c. W OODWARD, supra note 3, at 18-47.
47. Id.
48. Id.
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black witnesses about to give testimony before the law. The list of
separations was ingenious and endless. Blacks became like a group
of American untouchables, ritually separated from the rest of the
population. These state actions were abetted by federal indiffer
ence and sometimes outright approval.
The Supreme Court of the United States pronounced such
separations consonant with the fourteenth amendment in Plessy u.
Ferguson. 49 Subsequent courts would even ignore the de jure racial
egalitarianism behind the authoring of the fourteenth and fifteenth
amendments. The federal government even participated in its own
versions of Jim Crow, legally segregating at various times black
members of the armed forces and the civil service. 50 Overt legal
assistance from both state and federal governments to the Ameri
can caste system would continue for most of the twentieth century,
to be challenged only after the second world war.
After Plessy, challenges to such discriminatory laws turned on
the question of equality of facilities, as opposed to the constitu
tional permissibility of separation. This continued until 1954, when
the Supreme Court, repudiating the separate but equal doctrine,
proclaimed in Brown v. Board of Education that "separate ... fa
cilities are inherently unequal."51 The assault on segregation then
began in earnest, and the massive number of Civil Rights cases
that have greeted the federal courts since then bears witness to
this fact.
Against this background, the rigidity of American racial classi
fications becomes somewhat easier to understand. State supported
or initiated discrimination required racial definitions. The law
could not separate what it failed to categ orize. The law's emphasis
on race, an emphasis that legislated the most minute detail of an
individual's existence, had to be supported by an equally meticu
lous definition of an individual's race. Haphazard definition based
on appearance could satisfy neither the earlier demands of deter
mining who should be slave and who free, nor the elaborate proto
col of segregation. A legally mandated caste system needed at a
minimum to define caste membership. As the authors of that caste
system premised black inferiority and allocated privileges and re49.
50.
51.

163 U.S. 537 (1896).

J. FRANKLIN, supra note 26, at 324-25.
34 7 U.S. 483, 495 (1954). Brown's holding initially was limited to educational facil
ities, but was later extended to other areas.

Loyola Law R eview

266

[Vol. 29:255

strictions based on membership in one caste or the other, tracing
black ancestry back as far as possible became a prerequisite to the
smooth functioning of the caste system. 52 Whether law followed
custom or custom followed law, the idea that traceable African an
cestry made one black, with all the accompanying disabilities of
that status, had widespread currency in the United States in both
the black and white populations. 53
B. Race and Caste in Louisiana: Touched By Latin American
Traditions

Most Americans are the heirs of the preceding history of racial
caste and firmly believe in the kinds of racial classifications that
have developed in American law and custom. It is easy to forget
that the experience of African and Afro-American54 slavery and ra
cial adjustment in the post-emancipation period was not merely a
national experience, but a hemispheric one. Indeed, the bulk of
Africans brought to the New World and the majority of their sur
viving Afro-American descendants have experienced slavery and
freedom in Latin America and the Caribbean, not in the United
States. 55 It is important to note, therefore, that very different per
ceptions of racial group membership developed in Latin America.
A proper examination of Louisiana's own heritage in fact mandates
an inquiry into Latin American racial caste patterns.
The Latin American concept of racial caste is decidedly differ
ent from that in this nation; the idea that any traceable black an52.
53.

See Note, 34 Cornell L.Q. 246 (1949).
This observation is shown by, for example, the dispute in which the plaintiff in

Doe v. Louisiana is involved. Another indication of this concept is the phenomenon of

blond -haired, blue-eyed, and fair-skinned individuals who declare themselves to be black
and the occurrence of "passing." An excellent fictional account of this may be found in J.
JOHNSON, THE AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF AN Ex-COLOURED MAN (1927).
Further, in the nineteenth and much of the twentieth century, novelists and filmmakers
have regaled black and white audiences with an extensive fictional genre about "tragic mu

l attoes," white appearing Negroes who tried to escape their black status only to find them
selves despairingly lost between both castes in a society that demanded me mbers hip in one

caste or the other. See T. CRIPPS, SLOW FADE TO BLACK: THE NEGRO IN AMERICAN FILM,
1900-1942, at 301-03 (1977).
54. " Afro- Ameri can" is used here to describe persons of African descent throughout

the western hemisphere.

55. The United S tates received less th e n five percent of the African pop ulatio n
brought to the New World. In 1950, approximately thirty percent of Afro-Americans in the
Western Hemisphere lived in the United States. See P. CuaTIN, THE ATLANTIC SLAVE
TRADE: A CENSUS 91 (1969).
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cestry makes an individual black is alien in most parts of the hemi
sphere. Indeed, many indi viduals with visibly black racial
characteristics in parts of Latin America are considered white.116 A

variety of explanations can be advanced to account for this signifi
cantly different perception o f race. An older generation of scholars
argued that this difference could be attributed to the absence of
racism in Iberian culture,117 but contemporary students of compara
tive slavery and race relations in the western hemisphere have
found much to dispute in this view.118
In colonial Latin America, laws mandated different privileges
for whites and blacks.119 The newly independent former colonies of
Spain and Portugal often established separate military units for
blacks and whites in the nineteenth century.60 The twentieth cen
tury did not bring an end to the legal disabilities of persons of
African descent living in parts of Latin America. In fact, a number
of Latin American nations, while welcoming European immigra
tion, severely curtailed or prohibited the immigration of Africans
and Afro-Americans.61

Brazilian

president

Getulia

Vargas re

stricted the commissioning o f blacks in the Brazilian army in the
1930's and 40's. The Brazilian navy possessed a tradition of being
all white. 62 Legal discrimination and racial prejudice were thus by

56.

C. DEGLER, supra note 16, at 101-06.

57.

See generally F. TA NNENBA UM , SLAVE AND CITIZEN: THE NEGRO IN THE AMERICAS

passim (1947).

58.

The bibliography on comparative slavery and race relations is extensive, growing,

and too long to discuss here. One essay that provides a valuable focus for the debate is by
Eugene D. Genovese, The Treatment of Slaves in Different Countries: Problems in the
Application of the Comparative Meth od, found in SLAVERY IN THE NEW WORLD: A READER

IN COMPARATIVE H IS TORY 202-10

(L.

Foner & E. Genovese ed. 1969).

Note s hould be made of the fact that Spanish and Portugese settlers in the Americas
did not come to the New World innocent of anti-black prejudice. They had had extensive
experience with African slavery on the Iberian penninsula and had developed codes mandat
ing an inferior status for blacks, slave and free, before they embarked upon the conquest of
New Worl d territories. See D. DAVIS, THE PROBLEM OF SLAVERY IN WESTERN CULTURE 53,

103 (1966).
59. F. BO WSER, THE AFRICAN SLAVE IN COLONIAL PERU, 1524-1650, at 149-53 (1974).
See also Sater, The Black Experience in Chile, in SLAVERY AND RACE RELATIONS IN LATIN
AMERICA 3 28-35 (R. Toplin ed. 1974); Sharp, M anumission, Libres and Black Resistance:
The Columb ian Choco, id. at 89, 96-97.
,

C. DEGLER, supra note 16, at 79-80; G. ANDREWS, THE AFRO-ARGENTINES OF BuE
AIRES, 1800-1900, at 113-37 (1980).
61. See Corwin, Afro-Brazilians: Myths and Realities, in R. Toplin, supra note 59, at
385-402; a n d Wright, Elitist Attitudes Toward R ace in Twentieth Century Venezuela, in R.
Toplin, supra note 59, at 325, 336-37.
62. While the color bar in the Brazilian navy was never absolute, early in the twenti

60.

Nos

eth century, Brazil, in an effort to promote

an

image abroad that it was a predominately
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no means unknown in Latin America.
The pronounced differences between racial classifications in
the United States and Latin America warrant some attempt at ex
planation. One example o f these differences i s the different status
accorded the mulatto in most of Latin America. People in the
United States distinguish between blacks and mulattos, but except
in Louisiana, that distinction has been unsystematic. While infor
mal distinctions between blacks and mulattos in the United States
certainl y have led to important social and economic differences be
tween the two groups, they usually have not permitted the mulatto
group to escape the disabilities of the Negro caste; in much of
Latin America, however, mulattos are viewed as a group racially
distinct from blacks.63 Indeed, the common Latin American pat
tern of racial classification does not view black and white as dis
crete racial categories but, rather, treats race a s a continuum with
fine gradations of intermediate categories between pure black and
pure white, somewhat analogous to, although more precise than,
the classifications of mulatto, quadroon, and o ctoroon.64
In Latin America, the institution of slavery often had permit
ted the mulatto a different and higher social standing than that
enjoyed by blacks;611 freedom continued that t rend. The constituwhite nation, restricted commission in the navy to whites, sent white only crews to foreign
nations, and discouraged Afro-Brazilian enlistments in the navy. See T. SKIDMORE, BLACK
INTO WHITE: RACE AND NATIONALITY IN BRAZILIAN THOUGHT 48 (1974).
63. C. DEGLER, supra note 1 6, passim; L. RouT, JR., THE AFRICAN EXPERIENCE IN SPAN
ISH AMERICA 1502 TO THE PRESENT DAY passim (1976).
64.
M. MORNER, RACE MIXTURE IN THE HISTORY OF LATI N AMERICA 58-59 (1967).
65. This different Latin American perception historically has been related to two phe
nomena critical in the evolution of Latin American race relations. First, unlike the pattern
in the United States, Latin American slavery took place against a background of a relatively
scarce white population. In the United States, plantation slavery usually occurred in areas
where the majority of inhabitants were white. In those zones in Latin America where planta
tion slavery flourished, whites were usually in a distinct minority. Distinguishing mulattoes
from blacks became a useful, at times critical, way of insuring the survival of the slave
system. Just as early eighteenth century Virginia planters felt the need to make allies of
white indentured servants in order t o control the slave populatio n and thus insure the sur
vival of their plantation system, planters in the Caribbean and Northeastern Brazil felt a
corresponding need to enlist mulattoes to help insure the survival of theirs. But the needs of
Latin American planters extended beyond the demands of social control. Slave societies
needed an intermediate range of fre e laborers who would act as artisans, truck farmers,
shopkeepers, minor government officials, and the like. In the American South, that role was
fulfille d by nonslaveholding whites. In many parts of Latin America, free mulattoes per
formed these tasks .
Population differences also dictated different attitudes toward
miscegena tion. Miscege
.
.
nation occurred, of course, m both the United States and Latin America
. The official disap
proval of the practice in the United States, however, was related
to the presence of a large
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tions of independent Latin American nations proclaimed the same
liberal values as did their frequent model, the United States Con
stit ution , and the governments established were nominally demo
cratic ones espousing egalitarian ideals.66 The nations of Latin
America took the democratic-egalitarian ideals of their liberal
revolution even further tha n their North American model, gener
ally developing plans for abolishing slavery as part of their process
of achieving independence. 67 Yet the kind of popular rule and class
mobility that would characterize American society did not become
commonplace in Latin America; ironically, thi s helped mute the
development of a legally mandated racial caste system in Latin
America. The emphasis was on class, not race. Elaborate rituals of
restriction were not developed to keep people o f African descent
subordinate; instead, lower class persons, black, mulatto, and white
were all kept from exceeding their stations in l i fe. Racialist theo
ries were not required to explain why blacks were the anamolous
exception in an otherwise democratic and egalitarian society. The
operative theory was that m embers of the lower classes should stay
at the bottom of the social h ierarchy and not challenge what was
believed to be the natural order of things.
Those persons of African descent who individually rose in the
Latin A merican social hierarchy posed no threat to the social equi 
librium. I n Latin America, such persons were d isproportionately,
though not exclusively, m ulattos.68 In the absence of the need to
have the law shape a racial caste system, race in Latin America
became a more fluid concept than in the United States. Latin
Americans accepted the view that white was superior to black and
that the worth of the intermed iate categories d epended on how

white female population from the earliest times. An American master"s relations with his

fcrnttlf' sl11ves had to survive the scrutiny of his white wife. This l i mited, though by no
mt•nns

P l i m i nated, the natural tendency of a master lo take better care of, to perhaps ele

vnl1• his m u latto children. Frequently, Brazilian and Carribbean slave masterH were under

no sueh l i m i tations. Tbe small white population and the attendant frequent absence of
w h i t t· women sometimes al lowed more permanence in unions hetwetm masters and slaves
n n d 11 hl'lt.t-r ability for a master to provide a more secure Roci11I fooling for mu l11tln off
sprini:. S1•1· C. l h:<a.t:K, supra note 16, at 44-47, 226-:16, 2:18-:19. 81•1• al."' C. Hoxt:K, Tm:

1 ; 01.11EN A t : t:

Cit"

HKAZIL 1 695- 1 750, at 1 65-69 ( 1 962); V. MA1tT1Nzt:-A1.u: 11 , MAKKIAc:t:, Ci.Ass

A N 1 1 I '01.0 1 1 K I N N1N•:n:F.NTH Cr.NTllRY C11eA: A ST111>V
l l t:s I N

m·

HACIAI. Arr1T11m:�

�Ml>

St:x11A1. VAi.·

A S 1 . A v t: Sonnv 57-60 ( 1 974).

!iii.

K. K ARST & K. RosENN, LAw ANll Dt:vF.1.orMt:NT IN LATIN A M t: H l t A 4;1 . .tfi ( 1 97;, ) .

li7.

This was the prev11iling pattern in the Spanish speuki1111 n11tions of t hl' ht•rnisphnt'.

"

liH. < '. I >t:w.t:K, supra note 1 6, pa.• sim.
Tht· l.t · r rn i n t h l' L11lin America context is used loosely for purpost's of t h is discussion,
11111 1111 J>t'rson s of sodelally recognized m i xl'd blood.

mean-
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close a category was to either of the extremes. Race was soc ially
defined. 69 Indeed, one student of Latin American race relations has
termed this use of a large number of intermediate categor ies be
tween black and white and the fluid combination of social and phe
notypical racial categorization "the mulatto escape hatch. "70
Louisiana is heir to both the rigid Anglo-American and the
fluid Latin American patterns of race classification. Under Spanish
and French rule in the eighteenth century, free mulattos held a
distinct intermediate position between black slaves and the white
population. 71 The advent of American rule in the nineteenth cen
tury brought efforts to legally change that situation, to bring the
free mulattos of Louisiana firmly within the system of caste disa
bilities common to free Negroes in the rest of the South. Although
legislation was passed in the antebellum period in an attempt to
curtail what Anglo-American settlers in Louisiana saw as the
alarming liberties of the fre e mulatto population, such legislation
was only marginally successful.72
Free mulattos in Louis iana continued to e njoy considerably
more freedom than their free Afro-American counterparts else 
where in the South. Whites of French extraction regarded them as
a group separate from blacks.73 Many in this free mulatto class
were wealthy planters and merchants; some were even extensive
slave holders. In parts of Louisiana, this group regularly voted in
defiance of the law's restriction of the ballot to white men.74 In
antebellum Louisiana, Latin American patterns of race relations
and racial classification m anaged to survive growing American in69.

Id. at 104-05. Indeed, defining a person's race in Latin America lacked the scien

tific pretensions of the North American exercise. Rather, defining race in Latin America
often was more of an art, a curious alchemy where phenotype and social standing were com
bined to help determine racial category. "Money bleaches" became a popular saying in
many parts of Latin America. It would not do to call a black doctor black; he was some
category of mulatto. A dark-skinned m ulatto who had become a lawyer or a military officer
was of a higher (lighter) category of mulatto. A light-skinned mulatto with significant social
standing might be viewed as white. This latter perception was especially important in parts
of Latin America where the population of pure European ancestry was a distinct minority.
In areas of Northeastern Brazil, for example, where pure whites are still a small minority,
many individuals are classified as white who are known to have African ancestry. See M.
HARRIS, PA'ITERNS OF RACE IN THE AMERICAS 59 (1964); and c. DEGLER, supra note 16, at

103.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.

See C. DEGLER, supra note 16, at 219.
I . Berlin, supra note 37, at 108-32.
Id.
See generall y J. BLASSINGAME, BLACK NEW ORLEANS 18601880 (1973).
E. GENOVESE, supra note 40, at 401.
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fluen ce. Free m ulattos managed to retain a de facto, though not a
de jure, status as a group apart from the rest o f the black popula
tion before the C ivil War. A fterwards, that distinct status began to
erode. D uring Reconstructio n , the group iden t i fi ed more closely
with t h e rest of the black population and supported a general ex
tension o f the franchise to blac ks, instead of a l i m i ted extension of
the vote to their group, as some had advocated.76 H owever, Jim
Crow laws were applied to t h e m as well as the rest of the black
populatio n in an etfort to make them conform to the r igors of the
caste syst e m .76 Hence, the m ulatto escape hatch for Louisianians
was clos e d .
C . R a c i a l C a s te As Conte x t

Give n the e xistence o f racial castes, any act by a state govern
ment i n te nded to label "accurately" an otherwi s e unidentifiable
person h a s an impact on s u c h a person living in a legally segre
gated society. Such classifications would have an impact even to
day, for t h e inequality of condition and status resulting from dif
ferences i n color remains, as recognized by courts in approving
plans for affirmative action.77 This inequality of condition and sta
tus has been examined by r eported judicial cases, recognized by
statutes l egislated, and documented by the reports of individuals
of one race who have " passed " as members of another.78 Empirical
reports o f governmental and other institutional bodies also demon
strate such i nequality.79 Such explicit records manifest what Amer
icans have known by intuition and collective experience: that

75.

J. BLASSINGAME, supra note 73, at 56-57; w. DuBOIS, BLACK RECONSTRUCTION IN

AMERICA, 1 860 - 1 880, at 456- 57 ( 1 968).

76.

See, e.g., Plessy, 1 63 U.S. at 538, 552. Plessy, an octoroon, had insisted that he was

not bound by the state law requiring separate passenger coaches for the colored race. Id. at
540. Lee v. New Orleans Great N.R.R. Co., 1 25 La. 236, 51 So. 182 ( 1 9 10), made it clear that
under Louisiana law, any person of Negro descent would be affected by Jim Crow laws. See
also R. DESDUNES, Nos HOMMES ET NOTRE HISTOIRE 182-94 (191 1 ) , for a stirring history of
the accomplishments of Creoles in New Orleans and a complaint and a plea against the
imposition o f Jim Crow laws. Politically, the inclusion of Creoles under Louisiana's Jim
Crow laws may well have been a result of the group's identification with other blacks during
Reconstr ucti on.

77. See, e.g., United Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193 ( 1 979); and Regents of the
University of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 ( 1 978).
78. See, e.g., J. GRIFFIN, BLACK LIKE ME (1961).
79. See, e.g., NATIONAL URBAN LEAGUE, THE STATE OF BLACK AMERICA, 1978 ( 1 978); H.
SHEPPARD, CIVIL RIGUTS, EMPLOYMENT, AND THE SOCIAL STATUS OF AMERICAN NEGROES
( 1966 ) .
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achievement and the potential therefor are closely related to race,
and that while public discrimination is constitutionally reprobated,
private discrimi nation is no small factor.
It i s in this context, then, that Louisiana's racial classification
scheme must be examined, a context in which private discrimina
tion a n d the effects therefrom still exist, and one in which even
state sponsored discrimination is still found. The context is one of
an existing racial caste system. This, then, is the context in which
the effect of the equal protection clause must be explored.
II.

THE

MCGLA UGHLIN

TEST

AND

RACIAL

CLASSIFICATION

The equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment has
since its earliest interpretations been understood to have been in
tended

to

protect

blacks

from

discriminatory

state action.80

Whatever the violence done to this intentio n by the Supreme
Court's interpretation in Plessy

v.

Ferguson, n o action taken by

the Court respecting racial discrimination has been more shocking
than its countenance of blatant, undisguised discrimination against
people of Japanese ancestry i n Korematsu v. United States81 and
Hirabayashi

v.

United States.82 Ironically, these two cases were in

strumental in establishing the rule of strict scrutiny under which
racial classifications are viewed.
Part of this nation's conduct in World War II involved the im
position of curfews, relocati o n , and confinement of Japanese-Amer
icans living on the West Coast.83 This action, "fall[ing] into the
ugly abyss of racism,"84 prompted the Supreme Court in 1943 to
note i n Hirabayashi v. Uni t e d States that racial classifications are
"not wholly beyond the limits of the Constitution. "811 Indeed, one
year later, in Korematsu v . United States, the Court opined that
while " all legal restrictions which curtail the civil rights of a single
racial group are immediately suspect[, t]hat is not to say that all
80. See, e.g., Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 {1879); The Slaughter-House
Cases, 8 3 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873).

.

81.
82.
83.
84.
8�.

323 U.S. 214 (1944).
320 U.S. 81 (1943).
Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 215-21.
Id. at 233 (Murphy, J. Dissenting).
Hir� bayashi, �20 U.S. at 1 0 1 . The Court emphasized
the perceived necessity of the
.

s1tuat1on , notmg the crisis of war, the threatened
invasion ' and public safety as important
facts and circumstances. Id.
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such restrictions are unconstitutional. "86 In graphic and onerous
terms, therefore, the Court served notice that racial classifications,
even of the most damaging kind, might well be upheld if "courts

[first] subject them to the most rigid scrutiny."87
The lesson to be drawn from Hirabayashi and Korematsu was
that "classifications based solely upon race must be scrutinized
with particular care, since they are contrary to our traditions and
hence constitutionally suspect. "88 The test to be used to evaluate
such classifications was stated in McLaughlin v. Florida:89
[Where] we deal . . . with a classification based upon the race of the
participants, [it] must be viewed in light of the historical fact that
the central purpose of the Fourteenth Amendment was to eliminate
racial discrimination emanating from official sources in the States.
This strong policy renders racial classifications "constitutionally sus
pect," . . . subject to the "most rigid scrutiny," . . . and "in most
instances irrelevant " to any constitutionally acceptable legislative
purpose.90

Thus was enunciated the rule that classifications based on race are
suspect, to be subjected to strict scrutiny. Lacking any compelling
state interest or "pressing public necessity,"91 they must fall before
the demand of the equal protection clause.
Equally important to whether a racial classification triggers
strict scrutiny are whether a racially discriminatory purpose is pre
sent and whether the classification has any impact. Assuming the
e xistence of racially discriminatory impact, " [a] purpose to dis

criminate must be present. "92 "Disproportionate impact," the Su
preme Court
has said, "is not irrelevant, but it is not the sole
touchstone
of an invidious racial discrimination. "93 The Supreme

Court has "not embraced the proposition that a law or other offi
cial act, with
out regard to whether it reflects a racially discrimina
tory purpose
is unconstitutional solely because it has a racially
disproportio ate impact."94 Thus, in Washington u. Davis,96 an

�

86.
87 .
88.
89.
90.
91.
92 .
93 .
94.
95.

Kore matsu, 323 U.S. at 216.
Id.
Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497-499 ( 1954) (footnote omitted).
379 U.S. 184 ( 1964).
Id. at 191 -92 (citations omitted).
Kore matsu, 323 U.S. at 216.
Aki ns v. Texas, 325 U.S. 398, 403 (1945).
Wash ington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 242 (1976).
Id. at 239 (emphasis in original).
Id. at 229.
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otherwise neutral employment testing procedure which had a dis
proportionately negative effect on black applicants was upheld.
The discriminatory purpose need not be proven to be the sole
purpose o n which the challenged action rests. Given the conflicting
and

somet.imes

complementary

concerns

of

legislative

and

rulemaking bodies, " [r] arely can it be said that . . . a decision [is]
motivated solely by a single c oncern, or even that a particular pur
pose was the 'dominant' or ' primary' one."96 But a racially discrim
inatory purpose "is not j ust another competing consideration.
When there is proof that a discriminatory purpose has been a mo
tivating factor in the decision . . . judicial deference [to the legisla
tive will] is no longer justified. "97
How, then, can one prove a racially discriminatory purpose?
Of course, such a purpose might be express, appearing on the face
of a statute. Lacking such an explicit pronouncement, inquiry may
be made into the totality of circumstances of the regulation or clas
sification questioned. Discriminatory impact, though by itself nor
mally not a trigger to the rule of strict scrutiny, is one factor to be
considered. Not infrequently, the Supreme Court has said, such
impact "may for all practical purposes demonstrate unconstitu
tionality because in various circumstances the discrimination is
very difficult to explain on n onracial grounds."98 But while the im
pact o f the state action "may provide an important starting
point,"99 what is required is "a sensitive inquiry into such circum-

96. Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development Corp., 429 U.S.
252, 265 ( 1 977)(footnote omitted).
Normally, the widest discretion is allowed the legislative judgment in determining
whether to attack some, rather than all, of the manifestations of the evil aimed at;
and normally that judgment is given the benefit of every conceivable circumstance
which might suffice to characterize the classification as reasonable rather than arbi
trary and invidious . . . . But we deal here with a classification based upon the race of
the participants, which must be viewed in light of the historical fact that the central
purpose of the Fourteenth Amendment was to eliminate racial discrimination ema
nating from official sources in the States.
McLaughin, 379 U.S. at 191-92 (citations omitted).
97. Id. at 265-66 (footnote omitted). Part of the Arlington Heights Court's footnote on
this point should also be mentioned: " 'The search for legislative purpose is often elusive
enou�h,
without a requirement that primacy be ascertained . Legislation is frequently
mult1purposed: the removal of even a 'subordinate' purpose may shift altogether the consen
sus of legislative judgment supporting the statute."' 429 U.S. at 265 n. 11 (citatio ns
omitted).
.

98.
99.

.

·

Washington

u.

Davis, 426 U.S. at 242.

Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 266.
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stantial and direct evidence of intent as may be available. "100
The historical background of an action may shed light on the
motivations involved.1 0 1 In particular, " (a] specific sequence of
events leading up to the challenged decision" may prove illuminat
2
ing. 1 0 And of course, the legislative or administrative history may
be a source of material regarding such racially discriminatory moti
vation. 1 03 Once a racially discriminatory purpose or motivation is

ascertained, inquiry as to the discriminatory impact of the chal
lenged rule or classification must be undertaken. For purposes of
determining the impact of state regulations which facially merely
classify individuals according to race and apply equally to persons
of all races, it is important to note that state action, otherwise be
nign in its effects, which facilitates private discrimination, is con
stitutionally proscribed.

Kramer,104 a 1948
in Reitman v.
Mulkey, 10" decided in 1967. Shelly involved judicial enforcement of
privately contracted restrictive covenants prohibiting the sale of
property to blacks. Recognizing "that the action inhibited by the
first section o f the Fourteenth Amendment is only such action as
may fairly be said to be that of the States,"1 06 the Court opined
that the amendment "erects no shield against merely private con
duct, however discriminatory or wrongful."107 Nonetheless, state
This rule was clearly enunciated in Shelly

decision

by

the

Supreme

Court,

and

v.

again

action was fo und in the judicial enforcement of such private dis
crimination. Finding that "but for the active intervention of the
state courts, supported by the full panoply of state power,"108 the
private discrimination would not have been effective, the Supreme
9
Court declared the action of the courts unconstitutional. 10

Reitman

v.

Mulkey involved the constitutionality of a Califor

nia constitutional amendment which, by design and intent, would
have overturned state open housing laws and established in their
100. Id.
101. Id. at 267.
102. Id. "Sometimes a clear pattern. unexplainable on grounds other than race,
emerges from the effect of state action
. . " Id. at 266 (emphasis added).
103. Id. at 268.
104. 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
105. 387 U.S. 369 (1967).
106. Shelly, 334 U.S. at 13.
107. Id. (footnote omitted).
108. Id. at 19.
109. Id. at 20.
.

.
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place " a purported constitutional right to priva tely discriminate
on grounds which admittedly would be unavailable unde r the
Fourtee nth Amendment should state ac tion be involved. " 1 10
There, the Supreme Court adopted the holding of the California
Supreme Court which, " armed as it was with the knowledge of the
facts and c�rcumstances concerning the passage and potential im
pact of [the amendment] , and familiar with the milieu in which
that provision would operate, . . . determined that the provision
would involve the state in private racial discriminations to an un
constitutional degree."1 11 The California court's reasoning was con
sistent with holdings of the United States Supreme Court which
had found unconstitutional state authorized racial restrictions on
the right to participate in a political party112 and the refusal of
service to blacks by an operator-lessee of a restaurant located in a
building owned by the state, a refusal not authorized or en
couraged by the state, but supported by the "power property and
prestige"113 of the state and by the state's failure to halt the re
fusal of service. m
S imilarly, in NAACP v. Ala ba ma , 1 1 6 the Supreme Court in
1958 recognized the "interplay between governmental and private
action,"116 and held unconstitutional the governmental action,
finding that "after the initial exertion of state power", private ac
tion of a racially discriminating nature would take hold.111 The
state had claimed an interest in obtaining the Alabama member
ship list of the NAACP for the purpose of determ i ning whether the
organization was conducting i ntrastate business in violation of the
Alabama foreign corporation statute. The court found that
"whatever interest"118 the state might have had in obtaining mem
bers' names for the stated purpose, it was not sufficient to over
come the constitutional objections.m
The very act of classifying or labeling individuals according to
1 10.
111.
1 12.

Reitman, 387 U.S. at 374 (emphasis in original).
Id. at 378-79.

1 14.

Nixon v. Concon, 286 U.S. 73 ( 1 932).
Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715, 725
( 1961 ) .
Id.

1 15.

357 U.S. 449 ( 1958).

1 16.
1 17.

Id. at 463.
Id.

1 13.

1 18. Id. at 465. The Court was "unable to perceive that
the [requested] disclosure . . .
has a substantial bearing" on the issues the state wished to resolve.
Id. at 464.
1 1 9. Id. at 465. Also at issue was the right to freedom of
association. Id. at 466.
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held to be violative of the equal protection

clause.
rac e has b een
Anderso n v. Martin1 2 0 involved a Louisiana statute requiring that

nomina tion papers and ballots designate the race of all candidates
1 1
for pu blic office. 2 The Supreme Court concluded that the statute
was unconstitutional, stating,
[This case] has to do only with the right of a state to require or
encourage its voters to discriminate upon grounds of race. In the
abstract, Louisiana imposes no restriction upon anyone's candidacy
nor upon an elector's choice i n the casting of his ballot. But by plac
ing a racial label on a candidate . . . the State furnishes a vehicle by
which racial prejudice may be s o aroused as to operate against one
group because of race and for another. This is true because by di
recting the citizen's attention to the single consideration of race or
color, the state indicates that a candidate's race or color is an impor
tant-perhaps paramount-consideration in the citizen's choice,
which may decisively influence the citizen to cast his ballot along
racial lines. . . . The vice lies not in the resulting inquiry but in the
placing of the power of the state behind a racial classification that
induces racial prejudice at the polls. 122

In recognizing the impetus toward racial discrimination when ra
cially identifying information is supplied, the Supreme Court in ef
fect recognized the existence of racial castes, existing if not in the
entire nation, then surely at least in Louisiana, whose state statute
was considered i n Anderson.
Although no "compelling state interest" could be found to val
idate the racial classification i n Anderson, such a justification was
found i n Hamm v. Virginia State Board of Elections. 1 23 That case

involved three separate Virginia statutes, mandating respectively
that racially separate lists of qualified voters be maintained, that
racially segregated records be maintained respecting property own
ership and tax records, and that the races of spouses be noted on
divorce d ecrees. 1 24 In a decision affirmed by the Supreme Court, a
three judge panel struck down the first two requirements, but up
-

hel d the third, reasoning that "the designation of race, just as sex
or religious denomination, may in certain records serve a useful
1 20.

37.'> U.S. 399 ( 1 964).

121.

Id. at 400.

1 22.

Id. at 402 .

1 2:l.

2:m F. Supp. 156

1 9 ( 1 964) .
1 24.

(E.D.

Va.), aff'd per curiam .�u b nom Tancil

Hamm, 230 F. Supp. at 157.

v.

Woolls, 379 U.S.
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purpose, and the procurement and compilation o f such inform ation
by State authorities cannot be outlawed per se. "1 2 5 The mere
"chronicling of racial data for identification and statistical use,"
the court found, "violate [d] no constitutional privilege. "1 26 The
purpose of the statute , the compilation of vital s tatistics , was thus
7
held legitimate. 1 2
Louisiana's racial classification statutes are clearly related to

the collection of vital statistics; however, the purpose and motiva

tion behind the statutes, a s well as the impact o f the statutes on
protected racial classes, must b e examined closely. Section I of this
article illustrated the discriminatory impact o f such classification,

the identification as members of an inferior racial caste persons
who m ight otherwise be free from discrimination. The following
section will discuss the motivation behind Louisiana's racial classi

fication scheme, concluding that it is discriminatory, and thus pro

scribed by the equal protection clause.
III. LOUISIANA AND
PURPOSE DISCLOSED

RACIAL

CLASS IFICATION:

THE

The thrust of state imposed racial categorization or classifica

tion in Louisiana is threefold. First, section 40:34 (A)( l ) (k) of the

Louisiana Revised Statutes demands that the race or races of a
child's parents be entered on a birth certificate. Second, section

42:267 delineates as white all those with one-thirty-second or less
of "Negro blood." Third, Louisiana jurisprudence has established

that in order to change the designation of race on a birth certifi

cate, there must be "no
warranted. 1 2 8

room for doubt" that the change is

The provision demanding registration of parental race on birth
certificates, section 40:34(A) ( l ) (k), is a direct descendant of a law
passed in 1918 demanding the same registration.129 By itself, this
statute bears no need of prolonged scrutiny. Alone, it merely satis

fies an ostensibly valid state interest in collecting vital statistics . 1 30
However, it must be considere d in conjunction with section 42:267
125.

Id. at 158.

126.

Id.

127.

Id.

128.

See

129.

1918 La. Acts 257, § 14(10) & ( 16).
Cf. Hamm, 230 F. Supp at 158 n. 19.

130.

supra notes 6-10 and accompanying text.
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and pert inent Louisiana caselaw.
Section 4 2:267, defining who is white and who is black, has no
statutory historical analogue, and there is no recorded legislative
history of the purpose or motivation behind the act as passed.
Nonetheless, the Louisiana Supreme Court has stated, "A reasona
ble explanation of the legislative purpose of the act is that it was a
defin ition , not of the terms indicated in the title, but of the phrase
'traceable amount,' formerly of legal significance in racial designa
tion in this State."1 31 Specifically, a person with a traceable
amount of Negro blood was considered a Negro. 1 32 Section 42:267
was meant to change this definition, limiting the a mount of tracea
ble blood considered significant. 133
Such definitions of race have been important only to a few.
Those o f Negro descent who evinced such descent through skin
color and other features, as well as those whites with Caucasoid
racial characteristics, would not be affected. But for both whites
and blacks who exhibited the phenotypic features of the opposite
race , such a definition could be crucial.134 Such definitions have
been necessary to maintain the separation of racial groups that has
been endemic to the nation, and especially to the South. A slave
state before the Civil War, Louisiana, like other southern states,
took full advantage of the freedom to discriminate enunciated by
Plessy v. Ferguson13" to expand upon the Jim Crow laws its legisla
ture had passed following the Civil War and Reconstruction.136

1 :1 1 .

Plaia, 296 So. 2d at 810.

1 a2.

Sunseri v. Cassagne, 195 L a . 1 9, 196 So. 7 (1940).

1:n

Act 4 4 1 of the 1983 Regular Session repealed section 267 h u t d i d not include a

new standard to be substituted. Consequently, Louisiana appeal courts deciding Doe

u.

Lou

i.<iana are l e ft with little statutory gui d ance as to the definition of race. While it may be
argued that the legislature had no inte n tion to renew the traceahle amount standard, the
imposition of any other definition by a court would be arbitrary. It m ight be consistent with
the le!(islative i n tent for a court to give some weight to the self-designation of an individual
such as Suzy <;u i llory Phipps, hut un less such self-designation becomes presumptive, it
would be vi rtually impossible for such a self-des ignation to overcome the no doubt ut nil

burden o f proof.
l :l4.
l :lfi.

See, e.g. , Messina v . Ciaccio, 290 So. 2d :l:i9, :140 ( La. App. 4th Cir. 1 !174).
See supra text accompanying note :l7.

l:l6. Some examples of Jim C row laws which were in effect prior to l'l1'ssy nre 1 8!}4 La.
Acts 98 ( requir ing that railway companies provide sepurnt.e hut equal wniting r1u1ms in the ir
depot11 "for t h e white end colored races"); 1 894 La. Acts !i4 (pro h i b i t i n g mn rr i 11g!'s between
white persons end " persons of color " ) ; I 890 La. AcL� 1 1 1 (mundnting se gr cl{ a t ion on rnilroarl

cars). After P lessy was decided in 1 896. the .J i m Crow laws included J �J l 8 Ln. ArL� 2f1 I (seg
reKnting prisons); end 1 9 1 6 La. AcL� 1 1 8 ( requ i ri n g "sepnrntc ticket otlicl's nn cl Pntrnn<'l'H for

the 11cco m m od et io n o f the ditferenl races" a t "shows, rirruses nnd tent !' x h i h i l inns").
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Because of its large class of free Negroes, or gens de couleur
libres, during the era of slavery, and because of certain unique
practices respecting miscegenous relationships between white men
and light-skinned black women, Louisiana developed a self-perpet
uating class of "Creoles," p ersons who were not white but bore
phenotypic features of whites, and developed a preoccupation with
skin color .137 The preoccupation is evinced by the inclusive list of
terms in section 42:267 for persons with less than the threshold
amount of Negro blood. It is shown also by the s cholarly and pro
digious e ffort of the Louisiana Supreme Court in 1 9 10 to identify
and characterize the differen t classes of blacks and the characteris
tics thereof.188 Following an exhaustive survey o f the laws of the
states to determine the definition of the term " Negro, "189 the court
enunciated different definitions to be adhered to in Louisiana:
We do not think there could be any serious denial of the fact
that in Louisiana the words "mulatto," "quadroon," and "octoroon"
are of as definite meaning as the word "man" or "child," and that,
among educated people at least, they are as well and widely known.
There is also the less widely known word "griff," which, in this state,
has a definite meaning, indicating the issue of negro and a mulatto.
The person too black to be a mulatto and too pal e in color to be a
negro is a griff. The person too dark to be a white, and too bright to
be a griff, is a mulatto. The quadroon is distinctly whiter than the
mulatto. Between these different shades, we do not believe there is
much, if any, difficulty in distinguishing. Nor can there be, we think,
any serious denial of the fact that in Louisiana, and, indeed,
throughout the United States ( except on the Pacific slope), the word
"colored," when applied to race, has the definite and well-known
meaning of a person having negro blood in his veins. We think, also,
that any candid mind must admit that the word " negro" of itself,
unqualified, does not necessarily include within its meaning persons
possessed of only an admixture of negro blood; notably those whose
admixture is so slight that in their case even an expert cannot be
positive. Ho

137. See, e.g., J. BLASSINGAME, supra note 73; G. CABLE, THE CREOLES OF LOUISIANA
(1901); R. DESDUNES, supra note 76; J. HASKINS, THE CREOLES OF COLOR oF NEW ORLEANS
(1975); G. MILLS, THE FORGO'M'EN PEOPLE: CANE RIVER'S C REOLES OF COLOR (1977); F.

Wooos, MARGINALITY AND IDENTITY: A COLORED CREOLE FAMILY THROUGH TEN GENERATIONS

(1972).
138.
139.
140.

State

v.

Treadway, 126 La. 300, 52 So. 500 (1910).

Id. at 502-08.

Id. at 508. Note the similarity to gradations character
istic of Latin American clas
sifications. See supra text accompanying note 64.

Codifying

1983]

Caste

281

This last admon ition of the court, that there existed those persons
of mixed blood who might " pass" for white, was testament to the
fruit of Louisiana's Creole o r " mulatto" culture . It demonstrated
the poss ibil ity that one possessed of black blood m ight escape from
the caste to which such blood legally relegated h i m . 1 4 1
2
The legal deprivations o f race i n Louisiana h ave been many. 1 4
Until the assault on racially d iscriminatory laws following Brown,
blacks, i ncluding mulattos, q uadroons, octoroon s , a nd griffs, were
subject

to

a

host of discriminatory laws respecting marriage,

schooli n g , and public accommodations. 143 Given the existence in
Louisiana of a class of lig h t - s ki nned blacks, som et i m es hardly dis
tinguishable from whites, the legal definition of race and the classi 
fication of i ndividuals a s nonwhi te was crucial to the maintenance
of statutorily mandated racial discrimination.144 The "traceable
amount" standard was meant to ensure, therefore, that even blacks
who did not look black were kept in their place. This was the pur
pose of t h e law to which section 42:267 is heir.
The cement which holds racial classifications in place is the
standard of proof necessary to change a racial c l assification once
legally d e s ignated. That standard is that there m u s t be no doubt at
all that the original classification is wrong. This s tandard finds i ts
genesis i n Sunseri u. Cassagne, 1 411 in which the Louisiana Supreme
Court " h e l d that a person w h o has been commonl y accepted as be
ing of t h e C aucasian race should not be held to be of the colored
race 'unless all the evidence adduced leaves no room for doubt that
such is the case.' "ue In Green v. City of New Orleans, 147 the "no
141. This possibility has been recognized in other cultures as well. See, e.g., G. FRED
RICKSON, WHITE SUPREMACY: A COMPARATIVE STUDY IN AMERICAN AND SOUTH AFRICAN HIS

TORY 270-7 1 ( 1 98 1 ) . Fredrickson makes the point that the South African Nationalist govern
ment passed "A Population Registration Act" in 1950 to prevent the colored (mulatto)
population from passing as white and thereby thwarting apartheid legislation. Id.
142. See the illustrations cited supra note 136.
143 . Sunseri presents a prime example; an apparently phenotypically white woman of
Negro heritage was victimized by a Civil Code article prohibiting miscegenous marriages.
144. The necessity of state labeling by race is implied by the words of the Louisiana
Supreme Court in Ex parte Plessy, 45 La. Ann. 80, 1 1 So. 948 (1892) aff'd sub nom Plessy v.
Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 ( 1896):
The discretion vested in the officer to decide . . . [the race) to which each passenger
belo ngs, is only that necessary discretion attending every imposition of a duty, to deter
mine whether the occasion exists which calls for its exercise. It is a discretion to be exper
·

·

·

ienced at his peril, and the peril of his employer.
Id. at 951 ( e mphasis added).
145.

146.

1 9 1 La. 209, 185 So. 1 ( 1938), aff'd on reh'g 195 La. 19, 1 96 So. 7 ( 1 940).
State ex rel. Treadway v. Louisiana State Bd. of Health, 56 So. 2d 249, 249 ( La.
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room for doubt" language was extended to provide vital records
with a nearly irrebuttable presumption of a ccuracy respecting
race. 148 And since the decision in Green, this presumption has been
reiterated

by other courts,

including the

Louisiana Supreme

Court. 149
The no room for doubt burden of proof therefore makes cer
tain that no person labeled black because of heredity might escape
such categorization because of doubts that skin color might engen
der. Given that this burden is more difficult to carry than the crim
inal " beyond a reasonable doubt" standard, a n d the recognized
possibility of error among vital records, the implication that the
rule is intended to keep phenotypically white blacks within the
ambit of societal scorn is most impelling. Especially when consid
ered with section 42:267, the rule must be considered part of a
scheme to publicly identify as black those who might otherwise be
missed.

State ex rel Plaia

v.

Board of Health is the only Louisiana

Supreme Court decision to construe section 42:267 in conjunction
with the stringent no doubt at all standard. 150 In Plaia, the court
failed to find any invidious racial discrimination, as the statute
merely classifies, and does not require action based on the racial
designation. The court's decision was rendered over a strenuous
dissentm which argued that administrative regulations promul
gated to enforce the statute 1 52 required "positive action" on behalf
App. Orl.) aff'd 221 La. 1048, 61 So. 2d 735 (1952). (quoting Sunseri, 191 La. at 209, 185 So.
at 5).
147. 88 So. 2d 76 (La. App. Orl. 1956).
148. One commentator has said that this expansion was a misreading of the Louisiana
Supreme Court's earlier language in Sunseri. See G. Pugh, Burden of Proof "No Doubt at
All, " The Work of the Louisiana Appellate Courts for the 1967-1968 Term, 29 LA. L. REV.
310, 311, 313 (1969).
149. Plaia, 296 So. 2d at 810 ("no room for doubt"). See also Thomas v. Louisiana
State Bd. of Health, 278 So. 2d 915 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1973) and State ex rel. Schlumbrecht
v. Louisiana State Bd. of Health, 231 So. 2d 730 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1970).
150. For a thoughtful commentary on Plaia, see Comment, Racial Designation in
Louisiana: One Drop of Black Blood Makes a Negro!, 3 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 199 (1976).
151. Plaia, 296 So. 2d at 811-13 (Barham, J., dissenting).
152. "l. The State Registrar shall strictly enforce the following rules and regula
tions throughout the State of Louisiana with respect to all certificates of birth and
death filed, or which shall be filed, in his office, in the office of any deputy registrar,
and in the office of the Registrar of Vital Statistics of the City of New Orleans.
"2. On the face of each and every certificate of any registrant having a traceable
amount �f Negro blood, according to available evidence, the State Registrar shall
stamp, with a rubber stamp, in red ink, beneath or adjacent to the confidential sec
tion of said certificate in bold letters the words: 'Do Not Issue Any Copy Until
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of the State1113 "that leads to a denial of equal protection of the
law."1114 In pertinent part, the dissent argued:
The act only applies to one race, the Negro race. Classifications
based upon race are inherently suspect and must therefore be sub
jected to close judicial scrutiny under the equal protection clause of
the United States Constitution. The State must show a compelling
interest in the statute in order for it to be sustained. Though the
State may have a valid interest in ascertaining the race of its citi
zens for census, voting, educational and other purposes, nonetheless
the act in question only applies to the Negro race. No comparable
statutes exist for the Caucasian and Mongoloid races. No regulations
have been adopted pertaining to those two races requiring the regis
trar to make an examination of their ancestry. The registrar has the
power to withhold or change the birth certificate of anyone having a

Cleared Under Act 46 of 1970 by State Registrar."
"3. When a copy of said certificate is applied for it shall be checked against the

evidence in the possession of the State Registrar, or which has been submitted to
him, to determine if said evidence is applicable to the registrant or his ancestors.
"4. If said evidence is not applicable it shall be so noted in the confidential section
by the State Registrar in red ink and dated and signed with his original signature and
no restrictions shall thereafter be applicable to said certificate unless newly discov
ered evidence is produced.

" 5. If, after checking, said evidence appears to be applicable to the registrant, he, or
his next of kin in case of death, shall be notified directly, or through his parents if a
minor, and notified of a date and time to examine said findings in the office of the
State Registrar.

"6. If the registrant or his representative does not examine said findings on the date
fixed , or does not dispute or contest them in a court proceeding within 30 days there
after, the State
Registrar shall correct said certificate in accordance with said evi
dence, and Board regulations, and issue a copy (or copies) of the certificate.
"7. If said certificate qualifies for clearance under Act 46 of 1970 the State Registrar
shall, with red ink and rubber stamp, place next to the registrant's name the inscrip
tion, 'White', or ' Indian', as the case may be.

"8. If the parents of said registrant as shown on said certificate qualify for clearance
under Act 46 of 1970, each shall be indicated as above. If one of the two parents'
genealogy is unquestioned it shall be indicated, as filed, or as properly corrected.
"9. If either or both parents do not qualify for clearance under Act 46 of 1970, in
accordance with the evidence available, there shall be stamped in red ink on said

original certi ficate opposite the race of the parent or parents the words, 'In question.'
This may only be deleted by a judgment of court.
"10. If an applicant who is affected by Act 46 of 1970, or his representative, makes
application for a certified copy of a birth certificate or death certificate, he may, at
his option, receive a short form Birth Registration Card or Death Registration Card

which shall contain all pertinent facts contained on the original long form except the
names of parents and facts concerning them.''
Plaia , 296
So. 2d at 811-12 (quoting the Louisiana State Board of Health, Bureau of Vital
Stati stics,
Regulation for Enforcement of Act 46 of 1970 (Jan. 30, 1971)).

1 53 .
154.

Id. at 812.

Id.
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traceable amount of Negro blood. Citizens of other races do not have
to endure this administrative procedure. m

The court in rendering the decision in Plaia failed to consider the
role of private discrimination, for example, i n employment and
housing, and the question of racial castes in j udging whether the
state action involved would be constitutio n ally proscribed. The
court failed to consider its own evaluation of the legislature's in
tent, t o define more precisely the traceable amount standard of ra
cial classification, and the effect such classification has had in
maintaining racial castes, be they state man dated, a la Plessy v.
Ferguson, or private in nature.
Inquiry into the development and role of racial castes reveals
the Louisiana racial classification scheme as a v e hicle to maintain a
system, perhaps dimming but nonetheless bright, of social caste
based on race. Given the history of racial discrimination , both
state imposed and otherwise in Louisiana, a discriminatory pur
pose is clear. On this basis, the invidiously discriminatory nature of
Louisiana's racial classification scheme must b e considered to vio
late the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment to
the Constitution.
IV.

CONCLUSION

The preceding three sections have established that the pur
pose of Louisiana's racial classification scheme is to p ublicly iden
tify as black those who might otherwise escape such identification,
that the effect of such classification is to subject such persons to
the disabilities accompanyi n g inclusion in an i n ferior racial caste,
and that such purpose and effect are racially d iscriminatory and
proscribed by the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amend
ment. This is not to say that all racial classifications are unconsti
tutional. Nor is it to say that all racial classifications and labelings
intended to identify those who might otherwise b e missed are un
constitutional. For example, to double check the effectiveness of an
order prohibiting discrimination, racial classifications might well
be used to beneficial purpose. Similarly, in order to determine
wh�ther discrimination is taking place, or to identify those to be
subject to an affirmative action plan, or to ensure that no one hen155.

Id. (footnote omitted).
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efits from suc h a plan who is not intended to do so, racial classifi
cations may be beneficial and effective, perhaps even necessary.
But u n t i l A merican racial c astes are obliterated , vigilance to over
come the e ffects of racial castes and of concom itant d iscrimination
must b e maintained.
In exercising such vig i l a n ce, the courts scrut i n izing Louisiana's
racial c lassification scheme, armed with the power to take judicial
notice of " the facts of history and the politica l , social and racial
condi tions prevailing in this state"168 and the awareness that "to
accord equal protection u n d e r the laws of this s ta te to all citizens
without regard to race, creed, color or national origin "1&7 is the
state's public policy, shoul d declare the racial classification scheme
of Louisiana unconstitutional under the federal equal protection
clause, as well as violative of stated public policy.
The peculiar rigidity o f racial classifications i n American law
has served historically to bolster a shamefully u n-American caste
system. It will hopefully o n e day soon be regarded as a grotesque
legacy of antiquity. That day will bring us closer to the wisdom
exhibited by former NAACP secretary Walter White, himself a
blond- h a i red, fair-skinned

man classified as "Negro" when he

wrote, " I am white and I a m black, and know that there is no
differen ce . "•&s

156.
157.

LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15.422(6) (West 1981).
1 97 5 La. Acts 638, § 1. Cf. § 2, relative to aggregate statistics pertaining to race as

opposed to specific labeling of individuals: "Statistics pertaining to race, creed, color or na

tional origin may be gathered by the agencies of the state and local governments provided
such statistics are not used for the purpose, nor do they have the effect, of fostering unequal
treatment or protection under the laws . " 1975 La. Acts 638 § 2.
158.
(1970).
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